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I. Introdueion
In Atkins v. Virginia,' the United States Supreme Court held that the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.2 In response to the Court's decision,
state legislatures were forced to evaluate whether their statutes complied with the
Atkins mandate. In response to Atkins, the Virginia General Assembly passed
legislation that amended Virginia Code Sections 18.2-10, 19.2-175, 19.2-264.3:1,
and 19.2-264.4.' This legislation also added Sections 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1,
19.2-264.3:1.2, and 19.2-264.3:3 to the Virginia Code. 4 The legislation has been
returned to the General Assembly with gubernatorial amendments.'

*
H.D. 1923, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003) (amending VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-10, 19.2-175, 19.2-264.3:1, and 19.2-264.4 and codifying VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.2,
19.2-264.3:1.1, 19.2-264.3:1.2, and 19.2-264.3:3). This case note will refer to the amended
statutes as §§ 18.2-10, 19.2-175, 19.2-264.3:1, and 19.2-264.4. The newly codified statutes will
be referred to as % 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1, 19.2-264.3:1.2, and 19.2-264.3:3.
1.
122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
2.
Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002) (stating that in light of our " 'evolving
standards of decency'" the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded is excessive
and violates the Eighth Amendment).
3.
See H.D. 1923, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003). Virginia Code Sections 19.2175 and 19.2-264.3:1 were minimally altered and will not be discussed further in this statute note.

4. See id.
5. Caveat: This note is based on the legislation as amended by Governor Warner on
March 24, 2003.
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II. Discussion
A. Section 8.01-654.2
Virginia Code Section 8.01-654.2 sets forth the procedure for those defendants who have a claim of mental retardation, but who were sentenced to death
prior to the effective date of this legislation.6 A defendant shall, either in his
direct appeal or in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, allege the factual basis
for a claim of mental retardation.7 If the Supreme Court of Virginia determines
that the claim is not frivolous, it must remand the claim to the circuit court for
a hearing on the mental retardation issue.8 In the case of a defendant who has
completed a direct appeal and a state habeas proceeding, his only available
remedy will be in federal court.9
B. Section 18.2-10
Under Virginia Code Section 18.2-10(a), the punishment of death only may
be imposed if "the person so convicted was 16 years of age or older at the time
of the offense and is not determined to be mentally retarded pursuant to Section
19.2-264.3:1.1.'"'l

C. Section 19.2-264.3:1.1
In Atkins, the Court left open the definition of mental retardation.1 Section
19.2-264.3:1.1(A) sets forth the definition for mental retardation as amended by
Governor Warner. 2 The proposed definition is as follows:
"Mentally retarded" means a disability, originating before the age of 18
years, characterized concurrently by (i) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as demonstrated by performance on a standardized
measure of intellectual functioning administered in conformity with
accepted professional practice, that is at least two standard deviations
below the mean and (ii) significant limitations in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social and practical adaptive skills.13

6.
7.
8.

§ 8.01-654.2.
Id.
Id.

9.

Id.

10.
§ 18.2-10(a). Current Virginia Code Section 18.2-10(a) does not mention mental
retardation. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(a) (Michie Supp. 2002).
11.
See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2250 (allowing the states to determine how to enforce the
constitutional restriction on the execution of the mentally retarded). See generaly Kristen F.
Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 117 (2002) (analyzing Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242
(2002)).
12.
See § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A).
13.
Id.
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Section 19.2-264.3:1.1 (B) dictates the testing procedures used to determine
if an individual falls within this definition of mental retardation.' 4 This testing
must include at least one generally accepted standardized measure that is appropriate for the "particular defendant being assessed, taking into account cultural,
linguistic, sensory, motor, behavioral and other individual factors."'" In addition,
a defendant's adaptive behavior assessment must be based upon "multiple
sources of information."' 6 Finally, a defendant's developmental origin shall also
be assessed. 7
Section 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) states that the mental retardation issue, if properly
raised under Section 19.2-264.3:1.2(E), shall be determined by the sentencing
jury.' Under this provision, the defendant bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded.' 9 Section 19.2264.3:1.1 (D) provides the jury verdict forms for the mental retardation determination.' These forms are to be used in addition to the verdict forms found in
Section 19.2-264.4(D). 2' The forms in Section 19.2-264.3:1.1(D) first state that
the jury has found the defendant guilty.' The forms then state whether or not
the jury found that the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that he is mentally retarded.' If the defendant proves that he is mentally retarded, then the jury can sentence the defendant only to imprisonment for life
or imprisonment for life and a monetary fine.24 Alternatively, if the jury determines that the defendant has not proven that he is mentally retarded, it then
moves to the jury forms found in Section 19.2-264.4(D).'

14.
15.

16.

§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(B).
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(1).

19.2-264.3:1.1 (B)(2).

17.
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(B)(3). The former President of the American Association of Mental
Retardation, James W. Ellis, suggested that states select a procedure that utilizes both IQ testing
and a more comprehensive evaluation of the individual. Molly McDonough, Atkins'Iripact: States
NeedStandardforDeterminingWho Is Mentaly Rttarded,IneigibkforDeatb Sentence, ABA Journal eReport
(Jan. 31, 2003), at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/j31mental.html. The Virginia statute,
by including both standardized and more comprehensive testing procedures, seems to comply with
this suggestion.
18.
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(C). In a bench trial, mental retardation shall be determined by the judge
during the sentencing proceedings. Id.
19.
Id.
20.
§19.2-264.3:1.1(D).
21.
See § 19.2-264.4(D) (providing jury forms for capital sentencing proceedings).
22.
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(1).
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
See id.; § 19.2-264.4(D).
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D. Secdion 19.2-264.3:1.2
In pertinent part, Section 19.2-264.3:1.2 sets forth the means by which a
capital defendant obtains the services of a mental health expert to assess whether
the defendant is mentally retarded and to assist the defense with the preparation
of mental retardation evidence.16 The report prepared by this expert is protected
by the attomey-client privilege.27 However, a copy of the report must be given
to the Commonwealth if the defendant chooses to present evidence of mental
retardation at the sentencing proceeding. 2 After the defendant gives notice of
intent to present evidence of mental retardation, the Commonwealth has the
opportunity to seek the appointment of an expert to evaluate independently the
defendant. 29 If the defendant refuses an evaluation by the Commonwealth's
3°
expert, the court may exclude the defendant's mental retardation evidence.
E. Section 19.2-264.3:3
No statement or disclosure by the defendant during his mental retardation
evaluation, nor any evidence derived from such statement, may be admitted
against the defendant at the sentencing hearing "for the purpose of proving the
aggravating circumstances ... 3 These statements, however, are admissible
under certain circumstances. The prosecution can present evidence of this type
in rebuttal if the statements or disclosures
are found to be relevant to issues in
32
mitigation raised by the defense.
F Section 19.2-264.4
33
The legislature amended Section 19.2-264.4's mitigation provisions.
Section 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) previously included "mental retardation" as a
mitigator. 34 The legislature amended this mitigation provision to state that "even
if § 19.2-264.3:1.1 is inapplicable as a bar to the death penalty, the subaverage
intellectual functioning of the defendant" may still be considered as a mitigator.3"

26. See § 19.2-264.3:1.2 (outlining the proper procedure for obtaining a mental health expert
and providing a time frame for the defendant to give notice of intent to present evidence of mental
retardation).
27. § 19.2-264.3:1.2(D).
28. Id.
29. § 19.2-264.3:1.2(1=).
30. Id.
31. § 19.2-264.3:3.
32. Id.
33. See § 19.2-264.4.
34.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2000) (stating that "mental retardation" can be
considered a mitigator).
35.
§ 19.2-264.4(B).
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III. Analysis

In its Atkins legislation, the Virginia legislature set forth a broad definition
of mental retardation. 6 The American Association of Mental Retardation's
definitions of mental retardation consistently focus on three components of
mental retardation: "(1) substantial intellectual impairment; (2) impact of that
impairment on everyday life of the individual; and (3) appearance of the disability
at birth or during the person's childhood."3 The Virginia statutory definition
encompasses each of these three components. 38 The Atkins legislation also
includes testing procedures that allow for a full evaluation of a defendant's
intellectual capacity.' 9 The testing procedures for evaluating a defendant's mental
retardation claim do not depend entirely on a standardized test, thus allowing for
a more comprehensive evaluation of a defendant.'
When counsel realizes that mental retardation may be an issue at the
sentencing heating, he must move for the appointment of a mental health expert
and demonstrate that the defendant is unable to pay for such expert assistance.41
Under Section 19.2-264.3:1.2, counsel must give the Commonwealth notice that
he plans to present expert testimony regarding the defendant's mental retardation
at least twenty-one days before trial.'2 This timing provision requires defense
counsel to consider a sentencing hearing strategy prior to the defendant's conviction. If counsel fails to meet this requirement, the defendant may be barred from
43
presenting mental retardation evidence at the sentencing hearing.
The Atkins legislation amended the mitigation provision of 19.2-264.4(B)
so that subaverage intellectual functioning can still be considered at the sentencing hearing.' If a defendant does not meet the Virginia definition of mental
retardation, his level of intellectual functioning can still be considered in mitigation. 4 Therefore, counsel should develop and prepare evidence for both purposes: (1)to trigger the Eighth Amendment bar on the execution of the mentally
46
retarded; and (2) to use subaverage intellectual functioning as a mitigator.
36.
See § 19.2-264.3:1.1.
37. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penaly: A Guide to State Legislative Issues
(2002), at http://www.aamr.org/Reading-Room/pdf/state-legislatures&guide.pdf.
38.
See § 19.2-264.3:1.1.
39.
See McDonough, supranote 17.
40.
See id.
41.
§ 19.2-264.3:1.2(A).
42.
§ 19.2-264.3:1.2(E).
43.
See id.(allowing the court to bar the defendant from presenting evidence of mental
retardation if he does not provide adequate notice of his intent to present such evidence).
44.
See § 19.2-264.4(B) (permitting a defendant's subaverage intellectual functioning to be
considered in mitigation).
45.
Id.
46.
See id.
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In the Atkins legislation, the Virginia legislature failed to acknowledge the
implications of Ring v.AriZona47 on Atkins.4" In Ring, the United States Supreme
Court held that aggravating factors are elements of the offense.49 The Sixth
Amendment requires that a jury find these aggravators beyond a reasonable
doubt.5" Under Ring, any "factor" that makes the defendant death eligible
functions as an element of the offense which must be found by the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. 1 The absence of mental retardation is such a "factor." The
absence of mental retardation, therefore, constitutes an element of death eligibility that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution before the
jury can consider death. Section 19.2-264.3:1.1 (C), in contrast, places the burden
of proving mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence on the defendant at the sentencing proceeding.52 Section 19.2-264.3:1.1 (C) and the verdict
forms in Section 19.2-264.3:1.1 (D) are unconstitutional.53
IV. Conclusion
In its effort to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins, the
Virginia legislature added and amended provisions of the Virginia Code. Under
this legislation, counsel first must obtain the services of a mental health expert.
Second, counsel should make the appropriate motions raising the issue of mental
retardation. Third, counsel must challenge the Atkins legislation as unconstitutional because it improperly places the burden of persuasion on the defendant.
The Virginia legislature successfully addressed several critical issues, but failed to
provide the level of protection for defendants mandated by Ring. Capital defense
attorneys should familiarize themselves with the new procedures and consider
the range of possible issues that they create.
Kristen F. Grunewald

47.
122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
48.
See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt every factor that functions as an element of a
greater offense).
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(C).
53.
See id.; § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (D).

